84 Alexandra Jandausch but is an experiential and conceptual process, in which we use properties, relations and entities that characterize one domain of experience/knowledge (Source Do-main) to understand and think about a second domain (Target Domain) that is dif-ferent in kind from the rst.1 Source domains come from everyday bodily perception and movement. They are grounded in embodied experience (grounding hypothesis). Source domains are needed and used to make sense of various target domains.Conceptual metaphor is a unidirectional mapping across cognitive domains. The mappings are tightly struc-tured and structure from a source domain is (partially) mapped onto a target do-main. The mapping is highly selective, as there are ontological correspondences ac-cording to which entities in the source domain (agents, objects, trajectories and so forth) systematically correspond to entities in the target domain. The point is, that we do not copy structure from source domain to target domain, but we import whole sets of knowledge /inferences/entailments from the source domain into the target domain. The mapping does not work according to an arbitrary rule, but it is a tightly packed, highly selective and constrained process that allows us to reason about abstract domains.Lakoff and Johnson use mnemonics to suggest the mapping, to provide an easy remembrance of what mappings there are in the conceptual system, so they devel -oped a strategy for the naming of these mappings.2 The form of a mnemonic name is either TARGET-DOMAIN IS SOURCE-DOMAIN, or TARGET-DOMAIN AS SOURCE-DOMAIN.3 The names of mappings have a propositional form. This must not be mistaken for mappings to be propositions. Mappings are not propositions but they are sets of conceptual correspondences. Evidence for the existence of a system of conventional conceptual metaphor is of ve types. Apart from psycholinguistic experiments there are generalizations that govern polysemy, inference patterns, no-vel metaphorical language and patterns of semantic change that prove the existence of a system of metaphor.4 For the case of music, however, there arise three ques-tions:How can the sensorimotor grounding of metaphor be explained? What characterizes the application of certain metaphors to music?Are there different levels of metaphor?The established theory of conceptual metaphor claims that cross-domain mapping is a motivated cognitive process, necessary for our everyday abstract reasoning, plan-ning and speaking.5 For cross-domain mapping there is a necessary subset, that en-1 Comp. Lakoff, G. 1993, pp. 202ff.2 Lakoff, G./Johnson, M. 1980. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 4ff.3 Lakoff, G./Johnson, M. 1980, p.31ff. 4 Lakoff, G. 1993. The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor. (pp. 202–251 ) In: Ortony, Andrew (editor) 1994. Metaphor and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.5 Comp. Lakoff, G./Johnson, M. 1980, Lakoff, G. 1993.