110 Stefan Koelsch movements are “composed” by the individual (and should therefore be differenti-ated from the motor-effects as one aspect of the emotional effects of music, such as smiling during emotional contagion when listening to joyful music; see next section). That is, it is important to understand that there is no objectivity of music (in the sense that music would direct movements of individuals like a puppeteer). Music can elicit an impetus to move, and this impetus can be intended by the com-poser or player, but it is the individual that decides to move (i. e., to follow some-thing that was intended by another individual), and it is the individual that “com-poses” the movements while moving to music (including dance movements, clap-ping, vocalizations, and singing or playing along).In a social situation, that is, when more than one individual move to (or play) music, meaning also emerges from joint, coordinated activity: For example, an ac-tion-related effect that becomes apparent in music based on an isochronous pulse (that is, a pulse to which we can easily clap, sing, and dance) is that individuals syn-chronize their movements to the external musical pulse. In effect, this leads in a group of individuals to coordinated physical activity. Notably, humans are one of the few species that are capable of synchronizing their movements to an external beat (non-human primates apparently do not have this capability, although some other species appear to have this capability as well; for a detailed account see Patel et al., 2209). In addition, humans are unique in that they can understand other indi-viduals as intentional agents, share their intentionality, and act jointly to achieve a shared goal. In this regard, communicating and understanding intentions, as well as inter-individual coordination of movements is a pre-requisite for cooperation (see also the Seven Cs, Koelsch et al., 2010). Cross (2008) stated that, in a social context, musical meaning can emerge from such joint performative actions. Cross (ibid.) re-ferred to this dimension as socio-intentional (ibid., p. 6). According to Cross, this di-mension of musical meaning would therefore “be oriented towards attributions and interpretations of intentions and intentionality in engagement with music”, and so-cio-intentional meaning “would be rooted in performative actions and sound struc-tures that afford cues about shared intentionality that direct attention in interaction rather than the sharing of attention per se: these may be, e. g., declarative and dis-closural (making manifest), concerned with the direction of another’s attention to an object or event distinct from the individuals involved in the interaction; they may even be dissimulative, concerned with the misdirection of another’s attention” (Cross, 2008,p. 6). Note that mental state attribution (such as decoding intentions of another individual) is not speci c for musicogenic meaning, but is engaged in re-sponse to any (man-made) musical signal. Therefore, mental state attribution is a meta-phenomenon of musical meaning, and not conceptualized here as a separate dimension of musical meaning. However, the thoughts by Cross on socio-intention-al musical meaning are relevant here because they describe how social interaction modulates physical musicogenic meaning. Also note that, as soon as (isochronous) music becomes a symbol for calling upon to move (in synchrony), then the meaning